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Disqualification of Corporate Counsel in Derivative
Actions: Jacuzzi and the Inadequacy of Dual
Representation
By S Kendall Patton*
Placing justifiable limits on dual representation' in shareholder de-
rivative suits requires an analysis of the fundamental question of the
extent to which a court, in light of the legal ethics of an attorney2 repre-
senting potentially conflicting interests, 3 should interfere with a liti-
gant's right to be represented by counsel of its own choosing. Recent
federal cases have disallowed dual representation in derivative actions
where only a potential conflict of interest4 exists between the corpora-
tion and its officers or directors who are named as individual defend-
* A.B., 1976, Harvard College. Member, Third Year Class.
1. "Dual representation" as used throughout this Note refers to an attorney represent-
ing, or attempting to represent, both the defendant corporation and the individual director
and/or officer defendants in a shareholder derivative suit.
2. "Attorney" as used throughout this Note refers to both the attorney individually
and the law firm with which he or she is associated.
3. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affdinpart,
rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976).
4. "Conflict of interest" is not expressly defined in the American Bar Association Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics, but a situation of conflicting interests is described in Canon 6:
"A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6.
The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association were in effect be-
tween 1908 and 1969. These original Canons were replaced in 1970 by the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Although they have been super-
seded, the original Canons still provide ethical maxims and standards of professional con-
duct which the legal profession should strive to maintain.
The CPR is divided into three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Consid-
erations, and Disciplinary Rules.
"The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the stan-
dards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with
the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from
which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
"The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of prin-
ciples upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.
"The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in charac-
ter. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
[347]
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ants.5 California, however, presently allows the same attorney to
represent both the corporation and the individual insider defendants
prior to an adjudication that a conflict actually exists. 6
The problem of dual representation arises from peculiarities in
American shareholder derivative suit procedure. In legal effect, a
shareholder derivative suit is an action brought by the corporation but
conducted by the shareholders. 7 The corporation, although formally
aligned as a party defendant, is the real party in interest 8 and the bene-
ficiary of any recovery resulting from successful prosecution of the suit.
The shareholder is only a nominal plaintiff.9 Thus, while on a superfi-
cial level no conflict of interest appears when one attorney represents
the corporation and its director, both named defendants, an inherent
potential conflict is always present, and an actual conflict must exist if
the shareholder suit has merit. In such a case the attorney is incapable
of fulfilling his or her fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to either cli-
ent.10
A myriad of problems arise if dual representation is permitted in a
derivative action where directors and/or officers are named as defen-
dants. If the shareholder allegations have merit, not only will the attor-
ney be in the untenable position of asserting a cause on behalf of one
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Preamble and Preliminary Statement to
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
5. Murphy v. Washington American League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Messing v. FDI, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.J. 1977); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics
Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir.
1976); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
6. Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., 243 Cal. App. 2d 1, 52 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1966). See notes 16,
107-09 & accompanying text infra. Contra, Elberta Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App.
344, 291 P. 668 (1930). See notes 110, 112-13 & accompanying text infra.
7. 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5939
(rev. ed. 1970); M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 87 (2d ed. 1979); FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1.
See also Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948), aJd, 337 U.S.
541 (1949); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213, aqj'din part, rev'din part,
532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976).
8. 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5939
(rev. ed. 1970); 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 714 (1959).
9. Comment, Independent Representation for Corporate Defendants in Derivative Suits,
74 YALE L.J. 524 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Independent Representation].
10. Note, Derivative Actions-Rowen v. Lemars Mutual Insurance Co.-Disqualfication
of Corporate Counsel and Appointment of Independent Counsel, 2 J. CORP. L. 174 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Appointment of Independent Counsel]. See American-Canadian Oil &
Drilling Corp. v. Aldridge & Stroud, Inc., 237 Ark. 407, 409, 373 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1963);
Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 172, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (1962) ("[A lawyer's] fiduciary duty
is of the highest order and he must not represent interests adverse to those of his client").
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (A Lawyer Should Pre-
serve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client); Canon 5 (A Lawyer Should Exercise In-
dependent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client); Canon 6 (A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Competently).
[Vol. 31
September 1979] DISQUALIFICATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 349
client that is antagonistic to the interests of the other client," but fair
inquiry into the merits of the shareholder claim also may be pre-
vented,' 2 distorting the future posture taken by the corporation in liti-
gation or settlement negotiations. Furthermore, dual representation
may jeopardize confidences and secrets obtained from each client,' 3
and may subject the corporation to great hardship if corporate counsel
is forced to withdraw midstream from the litigation due to an actual
conflict. 14 Finally, dual representation may easily cause an appearance
of impropriety, damaging not only to the attorney but to the legal pro-
fession as a whole. 15
This Note proposes that the federal rule requiring counsel repre-
senting both the corporate and individual insider defendants in a deriv-
ative action to withdraw as counsel for the corporation in all cases
where a potential conflict appears on the face of plaintiff's complaint be
adopted in California. In light of this position, the California Court of
Appeal decision in Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Brothers16 should be overruled
I1. Weaver v. UMWA, 492 F.2d 580, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appointment of Independent
Counsel, supra note 10. An attorney attempting to represent two clients with conflicting
interests in litigation is placed in the untenable position of breaching the fiduciary duty of
undivided loyalty to each client and is unable to deal competently with either client's case
because of the conflicting interests.
12. Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975). See Messing v.
FDI, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.J. 1977).
13. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), afTd in part,
revld in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976). But see notes 80-81 & accompanying text infra.
14. If an attorney accepted employment from multiple clients whose interests did be-
come conflicting, he or she would have to withdraw from employment, with the likelihood
of resulting hardship to his or her clients. In such a case it is preferable that the attorney
refuse the employment initially. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical
Consideration 5-15.
15. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 9-6. An
attorney not only should avoid impropriety but should avoid the appearance of impropriety.
Id (citing State ex rel Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165 Neb 80, 93, 84 N.W.2d
136,145 (1957); Schlotter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1976) (where
the court, construing the combined effect of Canons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, held that "an attorney may be required to withdraw from a case where there
exists even an appearance of a conflict of interest")). See also Comden v. Superior Court, 20
Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978) (where the California Supreme Court
required the firm of Loeb & Loeb to withdraw from their representation of petitioners Doris
Day Comden and Barry Comden where it appeared that an attorney from Loeb & Loeb
would be called as a witness for petitioners).
16. 243 Cal. App. 2d 1, 52 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1966). In a 1963 opinion in the same case,
Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., 218 Cal. App. 2d 24, 32 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1963), the court denied the
director defendants' motion to enjoin one of plaintiffs' attorneys from representing the plain-
tiff shareholders on the ground of breach of confidence where the attorney had previously
represented the corporation. The court held that there was no breach of confidence because
the attorney had withdrawn from representing the corporation prior to the occurrence of the
transactions that were the subject of the lawsuit.
insofar as it permits dual representation when only a potential conflict
of interest exists.
In developing this argument, this Note considers federal cases
from Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 17 to Messing v. EDI,
Inc., 18 analyzing the later cases in relation to the American Bar Associ-
ation Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Analogous cases for-
bidding dual representation in actions brought under section 501 of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,' 9 permitting union
members to assert derivative actions against union officers, also are ex-
amined. Against this background, and in light of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct of the State Bar of California20 and cases interpreting
those rules, 2' the error of the Jacuzzi court in permitting dual represen-
tation of potentially conflicting interests in shareholder derivative ac-
tions will be readily apparent.
The Need for Independent Corporate Counsel
Dual representation has occurred frequently in the past,22 partially
because directors and officers, who are charged with the responsibility
of selecting corporate counsel in spite of the fact that some or all of
them may be named as individual defendants, often designate the same
counsel to represent themselves and the corporation.2 3 Allowing dual
representation creates several practical problems which can impair the
corporation's ability to effect a recovery from its directors or officers.
The corporation usually is only a nominal party in a derivative action
and not permitted to actively defend on the merits. 24 As a nominal or
neutral party, however, the corporation may set up certain procedural
defenses which can greatly prejudice the plaintiff shareholders' chances
17. 57 F. Supp. 68 (E.D. Pa. 1944), affdper curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
18. 439 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.J. 1977).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976) provides, inter alia: "When any officer, agent, shop stew-
ard, or representative of any labor organization is alleged to have violated the duties de-
clared in subsection (a) of this section and the labor organization or its governing board or
officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate
relief within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor
organization, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in
any district court of the United States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction to
recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the
labor organization."
20. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-102. See
note 115 & accompanying text infra. See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West
1974).
21. See notes 116-20 & accompanying text infra.
22. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 524.
23. Id; Appointment of Independent Counsel, supra note 10, at 176.
24. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 371 (2d ed. 1970).
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of success in the litigation.25 Dual representation enables the director
and officer defendants, acting through counsel shared with the corpora-
tion, to raise procedural defenses early in the proceeding which may
prevent fair inquiry into the merits of the shareholder claim and possi-
bly defeat a corporate recovery.
In certain limited situations in which the corporation is a real de-
fendant to some issue in the case-for example, where the shareholder
complaint prays for the appointment of a receiver,26 seeks to interfere
with a corporate reorganization,2 7 or attacks a long-standing corporate
policy28-the corporation may be allowed to answer and actively de-
fend on the merits. In this instance, the need to ensure the active cor-
porate litigant a full and fair defense to the plaintiffs' allegations should
necessitate the appointment of independent counsel.
The need for independent corporate counsel is also crucial during
settlement negotiations. Plaintiff shareholders' counsel may not press
for the largest possible corporate recovery because, past a certain point,
increases in the settlement fund recovered by the corporation may not
significantly increase the fees awarded shareholders' counsel. 29 There-
fore, the individual defendants, as well as plaintiffs' counsel, both may
desire quick termination of settlement negotiations. 30 If dual represen-
tation is permitted in this situation, the interests of the corporation are
likely to receive insufficient protection. The interests of the corporation
can best be served in such a circumstance by separate corporate counsel
exercising independent judgment on behalf of the corporation.
The Trend in Other Jurisdictions
The practical considerations outlined above have been reflected in
recent court decisions. Although two federal cases, Otis & Co. v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co.31 and Selama-Dindings Plantation, Ltd v. Dur-
ham,32 remain on the books as support for the propriety of dual
representation, the distinct trend in the federal courts and in state juris-
25. Id The procedural defenses which the corporation may assert include alleging that
demand on the directors or shareholders to bring suit was not made, objecting to lack of
proper service, claiming that the plaintiff shareholder has not met the contemporaneous
ownership requirement, or moving that the plaintiff be required to post security for ex-
penses.
26. Id Goodley v. Crandell & Goodley Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N.Y.S. 251 (1917),
aif'dmem., 227 N.Y. 656, 126 N.E. 908 (1920).
27. Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 226 Mass. 391, 115 N.E. 488 (1917).
28. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), affidper
cur/am, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
29. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 532.
30. Id
31. 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), a'rdper curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
32. 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963), a§'dper curiam, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964).
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dictions outside California has been to disallow dual representation in
shareholder derivative suits.
In the Otis case, plaintiff alleged in its derivative action that the
defendant officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the
Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit Railroad Company had breached their
fiduciary duty to the corporations by negligently failing to "shop
around" for the "best obtainable price" on a new bond issue.33 The
Pennsylvania district court concluded that because no fraud had been
alleged and because the plaintiff was attacking long-established corpo-
rate policy reflecting on the good faith and good will of the corpora-
tions, 34 the corporations could file an answer and actively defend on
the merits. In denying plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel from
representing both the corporations and the insider defendants, the
court stated:
[T]here is no reason to require removal of counsel as petitioned. The
corporation, as an interested party having a right to appear and de-
fend, may select such counsel as it chooses. Moreover, there is no
allegation of any breach of confidence or trust of which either the
corporations or the individual defendants complain. . . . Moreover,
there are many stockholders' suits on record in which the same coun-
sel represented both the individual and corporate defendants. 35
The second federal case permitting dual representation was
Selama-Dindings Plantation, Ltd v. Durham.36 Plaintiff alleged that
the insider defendants had failed to obtain the best possible price on
the sale of certain corporate real estate and that defendants had spent
corporate funds improperly for the ultimate purpose of keeping them-
selves in office. The Ohio district court held, without discussion, that it
was not improper or illegal for a law firm to represent the corporate
defendant and individual director defendants when there was no ex-
isting conflict of interest and no breach of confidence or trust.37 The
Selama court cited Otis and Marco v. Dulles38 as the sole bases for this
conclusion. The court's reliance on the Marco opinion was inappropri-
ate, however, for at no point in the Marco litigation had the same law
firm simultaneously represented the individual and corporate defend-
ants. Furthermore, the Marco court never stated that the corporation
33. 57 F. Supp. at 681.
34. Id at 684.
35. Id
36. 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963), a]fdper curiam, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964).
37. Id. at 115. As pointed out in Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209
(N.D. Ill. 1975), affd in part, rep'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976), while Selama
stands for the proposition that dual representation is permissible in the absence of actual
conflict, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not discuss the dual representation
issue in its affirmance, and the district court's opinion has never been cited for such proposi-
tion. Id at 218.
38. 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959).
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and the individual defendants could properly be represented by the
same law firm in a derivative suit. Given the weakness of the Selama
decision as precedent, Otis stands as the only federal case in the past
thirty-five years providing support for the propriety of dual representa-
tion in derivative suits.
The trend over the past twenty years in both federal and state
courts other than in California has moved away from Otis and has dis-
allowed dual representation where a potential conflict exists between
the corporate and individual director and officer defendants. The 1959
opinion of the New York Appellate Division in Garlen v. Green Man-
sions, Inc. 39 was the forerunner of this trend. In Garlen, the court re-
quired that the corporation be represented by independent counsel
when it took an active stance and filed an answer. Three years later the
Delaware Chancery Court expanded this trend and required that cor-
porate and individual defendants be represented by separate counsel in
derivative litigation involving a potential conffict.40
The lead taken by the New York and Delaware courts was fol-
lowed by a New York district court in 1963 in Lewis v. Shaffer Stores
Co.4 1 Lewis was a derivative action brought by a shareholder of the
R.C. Williams Company against the officers, directors, and a majority
shareholder of the corporation to recover short swing profits allegedly
made by the insider defendants in the purchase and sale of corporate
securities, and to recover losses allegedly caused the corporation by cer-
tain transactions initiated by the defendants. The same law firm ap-
peared for both the corporate and insider defendants and plaintiff
moved to strike the appearance of the law firm as counsel for the corpo-
ration.42 The court granted plaintiffs motion, holding dual representa-
39. 9 App. Div. 2d 760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1959) (per curiam), rearg denied, 10 App.
Div. 2d 557, 196 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1959). Garlen has been followed by the New York courts.
See Russo v. Zaharko, 53 App. Div. 2d 663, 385 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1976); Langer v. Garay, 30
App. Div. 2d 942, 293 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968); Kelley v. 74 & 76 West Tremont Ave. Corp., 24
Misc. 2d 370, 198 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Garlen also has been favorably cited by the
federal courts. See Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885
(1962) (applying New York law); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 219
(N.D. IU. 1975), af'dinpart, rev'dinpart, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246, 256 (D.D.C. 1965); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores
Co., 218 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
40. Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962).
The Delaware court's opinion has been favorably cited by the federal courts. See Murphy v.
Washington American League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 219 (N.D. Ill. 1975), a ffdin part, rev'din
part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F.
Supp. 246, 256 n.62 (D.D.C. 1965).
41. 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (relying on Garlen v. Green Mansions, 9 App.
Div. 2d 760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1959) (per curiam), rearg denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 557, 196
N.Y.S.2d 593 (1959), as authority for disallowing dual representation).
42. 218 F. Supp. at 239. See Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 525.
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tion of potentially conflicting interests improper.43 The court ordered
the corporation to retain independent counsel having no previous con-
nection with the corporation to advise on the stance the corporation
should take in the litigation."4
Twelve years later, a strong and well-reasoned indictment of dual
representation was delivered in Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp.,4 5 a
1975 decision by Judge Marshall of the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. Cannon was a shareholder derivative action
brought against four officer-directors and two corporations. Plaintiffs'
six count complaint alleged misappropriation of corporate funds and
violation of state and federal securities laws. Shortly after the attorneys
filed an appearance on behalf of both the corporate and individual de-
fendants, plaintiffs moved to disqualify them from representing the cor-
porate defendants, alleging that the dual representation created a
conflict of interest. Plaintiffs requested that the court appoint in-
dependent counsel for the corporation.
The Cannon court, in considering "whether the same counsel can
represent both the individual and corporate defendants in a derivative
shareholders suit consistent with the ethical standards promulgated by
the American Bar Association and adopted by this court," 46 stressed
that resolution of this issue required an examination of "fundamental
questions of legal ethics and the extent to which a court should inter-
fere with the right of any litigant to be represented by counsel of his
own choosing. ' 47 After extensive discussion of relevant case law and
the CPR, the court held that the same counsel could not represent both
the individual and corporate defendants when a conflict of interest ap-
peared on the face of plaintiffs' complaint, and directed the corporate
defendants to select independent counsel to represent their interests. 48
43. 218 F. Supp. at 240. Although the Lewis court did not rely on the now-superseded
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, its disqualification of coun-
sel conformed with old Canons 6 and 37. Those canons provided that an attorney should
not represent clients with adverse or conflicting interests, nor compromise confidences of
present or former clients.
44. Id
45. 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill 1975), a]fd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir.
1976).
46. Id
47. Id.
48. Id The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has adopted the CPR as
the ethical standard governing the conduct of attorneys practicing before its bar. NORTH-
ERN DIST. OF ILL. GEN. R. 8(a) & (d).
Although the court in Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill.
1975), affdinpart, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976), relied on and has adopted the
rules of the CPR, these rules, like the original and now superseded Canons of Professional
Ethics, have no statutory force. The rules and maxims contained in the CPR and the Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics do, however, reflect the attitude of the legal profession as a
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Although the CPR, adopted at least in part by every state except
California,49 does not expressly address the problem of the conflict of
interest in dual representation, several of the Ethical Considerations
(EC) of Canon 5 of the CPR, taken together, do demonstrate the ethi-
cal problems involved in dual representation. Canon 5 of the CPR,
which concerns representation of multiple clients, provides that a law-
yer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client. EC 5-1 sets the tone of Canon 5 of the CPR: "The professional
judgment of a lawyer should be exercised. . . solely for the benefit of
his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither
his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of
third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client."50
Other Ethical Considerations deal more specifically with representation
of multiple clients. EC 5-15 provides in part that "[a] lawyer should
never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests; and
there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing
in litigation multiple clients with potentially differing interests."' 51 EC
5-18 goes one step further: "A lawyer employed or retained by a corpo-
ration or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a
stockholder, director, officer. . . or other person connected with the
entity."' 52 As the Cannon opinion points out, although EC 5-18 focuses
on the problem of corporate counsel representing corporate officials
when the corporation itself is not involved in litigation, it clearly dem-
onstrates that the interests of the corporate client are paramount and
must not be compromised by conflicting loyalties to corporate offi-
cials.53 When EC 5-15 and EC 5-18 are read together, they clearly es-
whole toward the standard of conduct of its members. E.F. Hutton v. Brown, 305 F. Supp.
371, 377 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1952), aftdrub
noa. Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The federal courts have the power
to enforce these rules by virtue of the court's regulatory power over the members of its bar.
Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1975), afd in par, rev'din
part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976). See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964);
Handleman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l
Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aft'd, 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
49. Forty-one states had adopted the CPR by the end of 1972. SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
SECURE ADOPTION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT, in AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 97 ANNUAL REPORT 268 (1972). Since 1972, eight additional states,
but not California, have adopted the CPR as the ethical standard governing lawyers practic-
ing before their bars.
50. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 5-1.
51. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 5-15 (empha-
sis added).
52. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 5-18 (empha-
sis added).
53. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 216 (N.D. IM. 1975), a 'dinpart,
rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976).
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tablish that the more ethical course in a derivative suit is for the
corporate defendant to be represented by independent counsel from the
outset.
Although no one CPR Ethical Consideration deals specifically
with shareholder derivative actions, the influential Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of New York has ad-
dressed the issue directly:
[A] conflict of interests is inherent in any [derivative] action wherever
relief is sought on behalf of the corporation against the individual
director-officer defendants, and . . . in such cases Canon 6 [of the
old American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics] pre-
cludes one firm from representing both the corporation and the indi-
vidual director-officer defendants except in unusual circumstances
stemming from particular facts in a given case.54
In addition to the above-mentioned cases and the views expressed
in the CPR and the New York Bar Committee on Professional Ethics,
the rule against dual representation has also been reflected in suits
brought under section 501 of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act. 5  Under section 501, union members may sue the
union and its officers for breach of fiduciary duty in a derivative action,
with any recovery going to the union.5 6 The derivative union actions
brought under section 501 have uniformly required that independent
counsel be appointed for the union when there is a potential conflict of
interest between the union and the individual officer defendants.5 7
As indicated by the above discussion, the federal courts and sev-
eral state courts have developed a strong policy of forbidding dual rep-
resentation in derivative actions brought by shareholders against the
corporation and its directors. Such a policy is both ethically sound and
equitable to all the parties concerned: the attorney will not be put in
the unethical position of representing conflicting interests; the corpora-
tion, and hence its shareholders, will obtain fair inquiry into the merits
of the action at the outset of the suit; unwarranted procedural defenses
will not be interposed; and the corporation will be adequately repre-
sented in any settlement negotiations. Furthermore, where independ-
ent counsel is appointed at the outset of the proceeding, the corporation
54. AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS, OPINION 842, 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 15
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80].
55. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976). See note 19 supra.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976). See note 19 supra.
57. See Weaver v. UMWA, 492 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Yablonski v. UMWA, 448
F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir.), pet. for enforcement granted, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1967); Milone v. English,
306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F.
Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965).
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cannot be subjected to the hardship of having its counsel forced to
withdraw from litigation midstream if an actual conflict materializes.
Continuing Areas of Controversy
Despite the soundness of a general rule that prohibits dual repre-
sentation in shareholder derivative suits, an examination of federal and
state cases shows that certain areas of debate remain. The first of these,
whether potential conflict requires disqualification, has been settled in
nearly all jurisdictions-potential, no less than adjudicated conflict, de-
mands independent representation for the corporate defendant.5 8
Counsel attempting to represent both the corporate and individual de-
fendants will often contend, in good faith, that there is no merit to the
plaintiffs complaint and that in the event that an actual conflict materi-
alizes they will immediately withdraw from representing the corpora-
tion. Invariably, counsel will claim that plaintiffs motion to disqualify,
when based merely on a potential conflict, is premature. This argu-
ment finds support in the fact that strike suits are still frequently
brought despite security for costs statutes which now exist in many ju-
risdictions.5 9 Furthermore, the corporation is usually only a nominal
party in a derivative action and corporate counsel may argue that to
require separate counsel for the corporation is unreasonable and waste-
fully expensive when the action may lack merit.60 This argument, how-
ever, fails to appreciate that independent counsel must be appointed at
the outset of the lawsuit to protect the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders, because by the time an actual conflict is determined by
the court the merits of the case have been decided. It is then too late to
have independent counsel serve any purpose. The Iowa Supreme
Court, in Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co.,61 forcefully stated
this position:
There is considerable force to the law firm's argument that disqualifi-
cation should await some inquiry into the merits of the action. The
court is faced with a dilemma. If the action is without merit, the
expense of independent counsel for the corporation is unjustified.
58. Yablonski v. UMWA, 448 F.2d 1175, 1179 (D.C. Cir.), pet.for enforcement granted,
454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Milone v. English, 306
F.2d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1962); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F.
Supp. 246, 256 (D.D.C. 1965). See Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D.
I11. 1975), aI'd inpart, rep'd inpart, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores
Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del.
Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962); Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 760, 193
N.Y.S.2d 116 (1959) (per curiam), rearg denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 557, 196 N.Y.S.2d 593
(1959).
59. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 530 nn.29-31.
60. Id at 530.
61. 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975). See notes 94-95 & accompanying text infra.
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This is an expense the [shareholders] ultimately would bear. Yet, if
the action has merit, the expense is justified and necessary. Since the
officers and directors control the management of the corporation, fair
inquiry into the merits of the claim may itself be prevented unless the
corporation is represented at the outset by independent counsel. Fair
inquiry into the merits is in the interests of the [shareholders]. Thus,
the [shareholders] must either pay the price of independent counsel
or risk loss of what might otherwise be a successful case.62
The Iowa court, finding a potential conflict between the corporate and
insider defendants, required independent counsel, stressing that the
"benefit justifies the cost."163
Federal courts have stressed the impropriety of a judicial inquiry
into the merits of a case in its early stage and, when presented with a
timely motion to disqualify, have ordered the corporation to retain in-
dependent counsel in cases where directors or officers are named as
individual defendants, creating an inherent potential conflict. 64 This
policy is consistent with CPR Ethical Consideration 5-15.
A second area of debate involves representation on behalf of a
passive or nominal corporate defendant.65 The state and federal courts
have not uniformly insisted upon independent representation if the cor-
poration is only a passive party. In Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc.,66
for example, the New York appellate court required the corporation to
retain independent counsel when the corporation actively appeared
and answered. Subsequent New York cases have followed the Garlen
rule, 67 inferentially allowing dual representation when the corporation
is only an inactive defendant. This distinction between the active and
passive corporate litigant was reflected in the voting on Opinion 842 of
the New York City Bar Association Committee on Professional Eth-
ics. 68 While the committee unanimously agreed that when the corpora-
62. 230 N.W.2d at 915.
63. Id
64. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238,
240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Cf. Elberta Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 344, 291 P. 668
(1930) (directors named defendants in quiet title action; motion to disqualify granted).
65. For a discussion of the distinction between an active and passive corporate litigant,
see notes 24-28 & accompanying text supra.
66. 9 App. Div. 2d 760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1959) (per curiam), rearg, denied, 10 App.
Div. 2d 557, 196 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1959).
67. Russo v. Zaharko, 53 App. Div. 2d 663, 385 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1976); Langer v. Garay,
30 App. Div. 2d 942, 293 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968); Kelley v. 74 & 76 West Tremont Ave. Corp.,
24 Misc. 2d 370, 198 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1960). The holding in these cases, that where
the corporation takes an active stance in litigation it should be represented by independent
counsel, seems to permit dual representation where the corporation assumes only a passive
role. in the litigation.
68. 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80, supra note 54. In contrast, commentators have
taken the broader view that the corporation should always be separately represented in a
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tion takes an active stance in the litigation, independent counsel must
be obtained, only a majority of the committee required independent
counsel regardless of the corporation's stance.
69
The New Jersey district court addressed the active-passive issue in
Messing v. EDI, Inc. 70 In that case shareholders of FDI, Inc., alleged
that the directors of FDI had violated provisions of the 1934 Federal
Securities Act, and attached pendant state claims of fraud and negli-
gence to their complaint. The corporation chose to take an active
stance in the litigation. The court stated in dicta that the need for in-
dependent counsel for the corporate defendant should not depend on
whether the corporation had elected to pursue an active or passive
stance in the litigation, "for that very election may have already been
tainted by conflict."' 7' The court, however, expressly limited its holding
to the controversy before it and required independent counsel only
when the corporation has elected to take an active stance in the litiga-
tion.
The distinction between the passive and active litigant is improper,
for, regardless of the corporation's stance, whenever the plaintiffs
claim has merit the interests of the corporate and individual defendants
must conflict. Allowing dual representation in the case of a passive
corporate defendant could cause the attorney to violate Canons 4 and 5
of the CPR by compromising the confidences and secrets of his or her
clients and breaching his or her fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty.
Further, the nominal corporate defendant is able to interpose proce-
dural defenses which may well defeat the shareholders' claim, and
hence the corporation's recovery. Dual representation provides the op-
portunity, intentionally or otherwise, to persuade counsel shared with
the insider defendants to interpose these defenses in instances which
are not in the corporation's best interests. The sounder course is to
require independent counsel for the corporation, regardless of the cor-
poration's stance in the litigation.
Another problem concerning dual representation is the applicabil-
ity of the consent provisions of the CPR to derivative actions. CPR
Ethical Consideration 5-16 provides that in some circumstances repre-
sentation of potentially conflicting multiple interests may be permissi-
ble if both clients are fully informed of the conflict and the parties
expressly consent to such representation. 72 Literal application of this
derivative action. See, e.g., H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 370 (2d ed. 1970); Indefpendent Rep-
resentation, supra note 9, at 533.
69. 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80, supra note 54.
70. 439 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.J. 1977).
71. Id at 782.
72. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 5-16. See
also STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-102.
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consent rationale to dual representation is overly simplistic and inap-
propriate because the corporation may only consent through its direc-
tors, who are themselves defendants in the litigation.73 This inherent
problem was recognized by the New York City Bar Association Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics in Opinion 842, where the committee
warned that "the unique relationship existing between the corporation
and its directors is such that extreme caution should be exercised in
resorting to the 'consent' provisions of Canon 6 [of the American Bar
Association Canons of Professional Ethics] as justification for such dual
representation. ' 74 The only justifiable course is for the courts to refuse
to allow the officers and directors of the corporation to consent to dual
representation.
A fourth area of controversy concerns distinctions drawn between
allegations of fraud and negligence in a derivative suit. The court in
Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.75 inferred a distinction be-
tween derivative actions involving fraud and those actions involving
negligence, stating that dual representation was proper in the absence
of any allegation of breach of confidence or trust by the director or
officer defendants. 76 The distinct federal trend, however, has been to
require independent counsel regardless of the nature of the allegations
in the complaint, in recognition of the fact that the problems of dual
representation impact the entire litigation process, whether the allega-
tions are based on fraud or negligence.
In Messing v. FD, Inc. ,77 the court, in dicta, realized the fallacy of
distinguishing fraud from negligence:
This court perceives no basis for relying upon the nature of the
charges against the directors for purposes of determining whether
they may share counsel with the corporation. Irrespective of the na-
ture of the charges against the directors-whether it be fraud or neg-
ligence-the interests of the two groups will almost always be
diverse. 78
Despite this accurate statement, the court limited its holding to the facts
before it and stated only that where "the directors have been accused of
73. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 216 n.10 (N.D. I11. 1975), aef'din
part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976). See 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80, supra
note 54. See also Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 528.
74. 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80, supra note 54.
75. 57 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'dper curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
See notes 33-35 & accompanying text supra.
76. 57 F. Supp. at 684. The Otis court distinguished Elberta Oil Co. v. Superior Court,
108 Cal. App. 344, 291 P. 668 (1930), an early California decision requiring that the corpora-
tion be represented by independent counsel when fraud was alleged against the corpora-
tion's directors. See notes 112-13 & accompanying text infra for a full discussion of the
Elberta opinion.
77. 439 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.J. 1977).
78. Id at 782.
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fraud and the corporation has elected to take an active stance in the
litigation 79 must the corporation retain independent counsel. Under
this restrictive holding, Otis remains the law in the Third Circuit, al-
lowing dual representation when negligence alone is alleged, despite
the fact that, regardless of the nature of the allegations, recovery will be
had by the corporation if the plaintiff's claim has merit. The fallacy of
the Otis rule is obvious; when interests are adverse or potentially ad-
verse, separate counsel should be obtained, without regard to the na-
ture of the charges.
Another ethical concern involved in dual representation is the pos-
sibility that the attorney's ability to preserve the confidences and secrets
of one client while representing another may be jeopardized.80 Al-
though this possibility may present a serious problem with individual
clients, the potential for harm is not as serious in a derivative suit be-
cause the confidences of the corporation already are totally accessible
to the director and officer defendants."'
The timeliness of plaintiff's motion to disqualify corporate counsel
is yet another area of discussion. When the plaintiff has raised the ob-
jection to dual representation late in the proceedings, the courts have
been reluctant to grant the motion,82 insisting that a motion for in-
dependent counsel be timely posed;8 3 and where the plaintiff share-
holders have voiced no objection to dual representation, the courts
have not yet demonstrated a willingness to require independent counsel
79. Id
80. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (A Lawyer Should
Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.). ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
No. 37 provided in part: "It is the duty ofa lawyer to preserve his client's confidences ....
[A lawyer should not] accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or
use of these confidences. . . . A lawyer should not continue employment when he discov-
ers that his obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new
client." See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974).
81. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 216-17 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affidin
part, rev'din part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976). See Independent Representation, supra note
9, at 526-27.
82. "A motion to disqualify counsel is the appropriate remedy for dual representation
and the onset of the litigation the proper time for its presentation." International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246, 257 (D.D.C. 1965). See Milone v. English,
306 F.2d 814, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192 (2nd Cir. 1959); Kelley v. 74 & 76 West Tremont Ave. Corp.,
24 Misc. 2d 370, 198 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
83. Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192
(2nd Cir. 1959) (motion to disqualify submitted nineteen years after the litigation had been
initiated in state courts). The court in Marco stated that "[a] motion to disqualify [counsel]
is of an equitable nature. A party making such a motion should do so with reasonable
diligence and promptness after the facts have become known to it." Id at 632. See Milone
v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (motion to disqualify considered "of an equi-
table nature and should be made with promptness and diligence after the facts are known").
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
sua sponte.8 4 In light of the strong interests considered in this Note, it
seems proper for the courts to require independent corporate counsel
with or without plaintiff's motion. Until such point is reached, how-
ever, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to file a timely motion to disqual-
ify.
The last major area of debate in requiring independent counsel for
the corporation is the question of who should have the power to ap-
point new counsel. Those cases requiring separate representation have
uniformly required that the corporation, rather than the individual de-
fendants, obtain independent counsel. 85 The logic of this rule is clear:
if the corporation kept its original counsel and the insider defendants
secured new counsel, no real assurance could be had that corporate
counsel would be free of bias toward the directors and officers with
whom counsel formerly had close association. 86 Implicit in the in-
dependent counsel requirement, then, is the requirement that the
newly-retained attorney or law firm have had no prior dealings with
the corporation or the insider defendants. 87
The problem of who should appoint new counsel remains. Lewis v.
Shaffer Stores Co.,88 a 1963 New York district court case, first ad-
dressed this problem. Plaintiffs there had filed a motion to disqualify
corporate counsel and requested that the court appoint independent
counsel. The court ordered the corporation to "retain independent
counsel, who have had no previous connection with the corporation, to
advise it as to the position it should take in [the] controversy. ''89 Simi-
larly, an Illinois district court in Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp.,90 rely-
84. Murphy v. Washington American League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1963). Although the court in Murphy found that in cases of dual representation the
defendant corporation and the individual defendants should be separately represented, the
court refused to enjoin corporate counsel from further representing the insider defendants
where all the insider defendants but one were not served in the litigation and the plaintiffs
did not object to that one defendant being represented by counsel for the corporation. Id at
397.
85. Messing v. FDI, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 776, 783 (D.N.J. 1977); Cannon v. U.S. Acous-
tics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1975), ard inpart, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118
(7th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Essential
Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 354, 182 A.2d 647, 654 (1962); Rowen v.
LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 905, 917 (Iowa 1975); Russo v. Zaharko, 53 App. Div. 2d
663, 666, 385 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108 (1976); Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 760,
760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (1959) (per curiam), rearg denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 557, 196
N.Y.S.2d 593 (1959).
86. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 533.
87. Id at 536.
88. 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See notes 41-43 & accompanying text supra for
a discussion of the Lewis opinion.
89. 218 F. Supp. at 240.
90. 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affdinpart, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir.
1976). See notes 45-48 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of the Cannon opinion.
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ing on Lewis, allowed the defendant corporations to appoint their own
independent counsel, rejecting plaintiffs' request that the court itself
appoint counsel as being without precedent.9'
Permitting the corporation to appoint independent counsel means
in effect that the board of directors will select such counsel.92 The
board may appoint partisan counsel and thereby circumvent the entire
purpose behind the independent counsel requirement, as the newly-ap-
pointed counsel may be prone to safeguard the interests of the insider
defendants at the expense of the corporation.93 This fear was ad-
dressed in Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co.,94 a 1975 Iowa
Supreme Court decision. The court found a potential conflict of inter-
est in a derivative action brought by the policyholders of the defendant
insurance companies sufficient to warrant disqualification of corporate
counsel, and took the unprecedented step of appointing counsel for the
corporations. The court reasoned that while allowing the corporations
(in essence the boards of directors) to appoint independent counsel
would "respect corporate autonomy and remove the appearance of
dual representation, it would not eliminate the substance of the prob-
lem sought to be avoided. Counsel for the corporation would be sub-
ject to the control of those accused of wrongdoing. ' 95 On this basis, the
court found judicial appointment of counsel preferable.
The federal courts have not sanctioned court-appointment of
counsel for the corporation. In Messing v. FDI, Inc. ,96 the New Jersey
district court, after commenting on the Rowen solution, declined to ap-
point counsel, stating that it remained the directors' duty, acting in the
corporation's best interest, to appoint independent counsel. 97
In considering the appointment of counsel problem, the right of
the shareholders and employees of the corporation to have truly in-
dependent counsel who will fully safeguard the corporation's interests
and facilitate the greatest corporate recovery must be balanced against
the countervailing right of the corporate entity to be represented by
counsel of its own choosing.98 A strong argument in favor of board
appointment is that such a course would respect the integrity of the
corporation as a self-governing entity.99 Allowing the court to appoint
counsel for the corporate litigant seems a harsh denial of a party's right
91. 398 F. Supp. at 220.
92. See Appointment of Independent Counsel, supra note 10, at 176.
93. Id at 184.
94. 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975).
95. Id at 916.
96. 439 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.J. 1977). See notes 70-71 & accompanying text supra for a
summary of the Messing opinion.
97. 439 F. Supp. at 783.
98. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 534-35.
99. Id at 535.
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to counsel of its own choosing. Whether a court is competent to substi-
tute its judgment regarding the selection of counsel for that of the cor-
poration's directors and officers is questionable. 00 Furthermore, a
forceful argument can be made that the directors should be permitted
to exercise their business judgment in appointing independent counsel
until such time as the allegations against the directors are proven.' 0 '
These considerations must be balanced against the likelihood that
board-appointed counsel may be biased in favor of the insider defend-
ants. '
0 2
Several intermediary solutions to the appointment of counsel
would be less drastic than completely denying the corporation the right
to counsel of its own choosing, and could still ensure the shareholders
that their economic interests would be adequately protected in litiga-
tion or settlement negotiations. First, if not all directors are named
defendants, a committee of disinterested directors could appoint in-
dependent counsel, subject to court approval, and thus preserve the
corporation's autonomy of action. When virtually all board members
are parties to the suit, the board could draw up a list of acceptable
counsel from which the court could select, or the court could appoint
counsel after extensive consultation with the board.'0 3 Either of these
alternatives would respect the autonomy of the corporation as an entity
while protecting shareholder rights through close court supervision.
A third alternative solution would be to permit the shareholders to
appoint independent counsel. This solution might well be viable in a
small, closely-held corporation, if the shareholders are not themselves
the officers and directors named in the complaint. Such a solution is
not practical, however, in a large corporation because such shareholder
action would require a proxy solicitation entailing enormous procedu-
ral costs, and would allow the board to continue to exercise its powers
and exert its biases through the proxy machinery.1' 4
Whatever method of appointing counsel is adopted, the court
clearly should continue to supervise the board's power to dismiss
newly-appointed independent counsel.' 0 5 Absent this supervision, the
insider defendants could dismiss the new counsel and appoint an attor-
ney or firm predisposed to serve their interests. Dismissal should not
be sanctioned by the court unless such action is in the corporation's, not
the insider defendant's, best interests. Continuing court supervision
100. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 535. See also Appointment of Independ-
ent Counsel, supra note 10, at 183.
101. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 535; Appointment of Independent Coun-
sel, supra note 10, at 182.
102. See notes 92-93 & accompanying text supra.
103. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 536.
104. Appointment of Independent Counsel, supra note 10, at 185.
105. Independent Representation, supra note 9, at 536.
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should shield independent corporate counsel from the pressures an un-
favorable board might try to exert. 0
6
The above discussion clearly demonstrates that an attorney who
attempts to represent both corporate and insider defendants in a deriv-
ative suit should be required to withdraw from representing the corpo-
rate defendant, regardless of the allegations brought in the complaint,
the posture of the corporation in the litigation, or the attorney's good
faith claim that he or she will withdraw if an actual conflict is found in
fact to exist. Furthermore, appointment of independent counsel need
not infringe substantially on the corporation's right to counsel of its
own choosing. Thus, the protection of the corporation's rights in litiga-
tion and settlement proceedings gained by requiring independent cor-
porate counsel justifies the expense incurred.
The California Position
The current California position on dual representation was enun-
ciated in Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Brothers,0 7 a 1966 decision by the First
District Court of Appeal. In that case a derivative action was brought
by plaintiff shareholders of the defendant corporation, Jacuzzi Broth-
ers, against five individual directors and officers of the defendant cor-
poration, and against Jacbros, S.A., a Swiss corporation. The
complaint sought rescission of a sale by Jacuzzi Brothers of its foreign
holdings to Jacbros and an accounting on the principal ground of inad-
equate consideration. 0 8 The court, in denying plaintiffs' motion to dis-
qualify the same counsel from representing both the corporate and
individual defendants, held that generally, "prior to an adjudication
that the corporation is entitled to relief against its officers and directors,
the same attorney may represent both."'1 9 The Jacuzzi court noted the
rule laid down in an earlier California case, Elberta Oil Co. v. Superior
Court,110 disallowing dual representation, but instead relied on the fed-
eral decision in Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. I"' for its con-
clusion that dual representation was proper. This reliance on Otis was
misplaced in view of the strong arguments against dual representation
prevailing in the federal courts and other state jurisdictions at that time
and which currently prevail outside of California.
106. Id
107. 243 Cal. App. 2d 1, 52 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1966).
108. Id. at 4, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 150. Three other causes of action were dismissed by the
court.
109. Id at 36, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
110. 108 Cal. App. 344, 291 P. 668 (1930). See note 76 supra and notes 112-13 & accom-
panying text infra.
111. 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), afdper cur/am, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946). See
notes 33-35, 76 & accompanying text supra.
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The Jacuzzi court gave scant discussion of, and no explanation for,
its rule condoning dual representation. The Elberta court was, in con-
trast, specific in its reasoning requiring independent counsel. In El-
berta, plaintiffs brought their action against the corporation and its
officers and directors, alleging that the officers and directors had fraud-
ulently used inside information to acquire oil rich land for themselves
to the exclusion of the corporation. Plaintiffs sought, inter alia, to have
the individual defendants convey the property to defendant Elberta Oil
Company and to quiet title to the property in the corporation. 12 One
of the individual defendants filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs
and the defendant corporation. The court stated that if the plaintiffs'
allegations were proved true the corporation would be entitled to re-
cover from the defendants, that in advance of trial it was impossible to
determine whether the interests of the cross-complainant and the cor-
poration were adverse, and that such a potential conflict required that
the corporation be represented by independent counsel. 13 The Elberta
decision subsequently has been relied upon as authority by the federal
courts. 114
The Jacuzzi court may have distinguished Elberta, albeit without
discussion, because the cross-complaint in Elberta necessarily indicated
a conflict between the corporation and the director defendants, and be-
cause in Elberta specific allegations of fraud and misappropriation
were made. The previous discussion, however, has shown the weakness
of such distinctions and the patent unfairness to shareholders whose
interests are at stake when the same attorney is permitted to represent
potentially conflicting interests. From an ethical standpoint, Elberta,
and not Jacuzzi, states the sounder position, which California courts
should adopt.
The Elberta position also is supported by proper interpretation of
Rule 5-102 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of
California, which states:
(A) A member of the State Bar shall not accept professional em-
ployment without first disclosing his relation, if any, with the adverse
party, and his interest, if any, in the subject matter of the employ-
ment. A member of the State Bar who accepts employment under
this rule shall first obtain the client's written consent to such employ-
ment.
(B) A member of the State Bar shall not represent conflicting inter-
ests, except with the express consent of all parties concerned. 
115
112. 108 Cal. App. at 345-46, 291 P. at 669 (1930).
113. Id at 348, 291 P. at 669-70.
114. Tucker v. Shaw, 269 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), affid, 378 F.2d 304
(2d Cir. 1967); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246, 256 n.62
(D.D.C. 1965).
115. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-102. Rule
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In properly interpreting Rule 5-102, the lack of California opin-
ions addressing dual representation in derivative actions necessitates
examination of other cases involving representation of multiple inter-
ests. California cases interpreting the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the State Bar of California, when applied to other instances of potential
conflict in representing multiple interests such as are encountered in
divorce and insurance actions, have split on the propriety of multiple
representation. One line of cases permits an attorney to represent liti-
gants whose interests potentially conflict provided that the attorney has
made a full disclosure to all the litigants and the litigants consent to the
common representation.If6 In Lysick v. Walcom,"17 for instance, the
same attorney had represented both the insurer and insured at trial.
The court of appeal there stated: "In California, an attorney may usu-
ally, under minimum standards of professional ethics, represent dual
interests as long as full consent and full disclosure occur."'"18 This rule
is not an adequate standard in derivative actions for two reasons. First,
attorneys should not strive merely to meet minimum ethical standards,
but rather should represent their client with full and undivided loyalty,
and avoid not only professional impropriety but the appearance of im-
propriety. This is impossible where an attorney attempts to represent
conflicting interests. Second, as noted earlier,"19 the consent doctrine is
particularly inappropriate in a shareholder derivative action, because
the individual director and officer defendants themselves grant the con-
sent.
The second line of cases interpreting the California Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct have held that counsel representing multiple inter-
5-102 became effective January 1, 1975, replacing former Rules 6 and 7 which were in effect
in 1966 when Jacuzzi was decided. Former Rules 6 and 7 were identical to present Rule 5-
102, except that the former rules did not have the written consent requirement which is now
part of Rule 5-102(A).
The Rules of Professional Conduct are binding upon all members of the California Bar.
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-100; CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6077 (West 1974). Willful breach of these rules empowers the Board of Gov-
ernors of the State Bar of California to discipline the attorney, and to recommend that the
California Supreme Court disbar or suspend the attorney from practice. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 6077, 6078 (West 1974).
116. See Kagel v. First Commonwealth Co., 534 F.2d 194, 195 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (applying California law); Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 919, 927, 75 Cal. Rptr. 580, 585 (1969); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136,
147, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413-14 (1968); Grove v. Grove Valve & Regulator Co., 213 Cal. App.
2d 646, 652, 29 Cal. Rptr. 150, 154 (1963). It should be noted that informed written consent
of all the litigants is a prerequisite to representation of conflicting interests under the Cali-
fornia Rules of Professional Conduct. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-102(B).
117. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
118. Id at 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14 (interpreting old Rules 6 and 7).
119. See notes 72-74 & accompanying text supra.
ests should terminate the attorney-client relationship when the
discharge of a duty to one client conflicts with the attorney's duty to
another client.' 20 Such an interpretation is more in keeping with the
spirit of the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the CPR.
Although these cases dealt with actual conflict, their rationale is
equally applicable to the potential conflict inherent in derivative ac-
tions.' 2' This rule will ensure that the corporation receives a full and
fair investigation into the merits of the complaint and has the benefit of
full loyalty from counsel with no duty to opposing parties.
Applying the California Rules of Professional Conduct, while rec-
ognizing the inapplicability of the consent provisions therein to deriva-
tive actions, should produce the same result in California as in the
federal courts: independent counsel should be required to represent the
corporation in derivative litigation whenever directors and/or officers
of the corporation are named as individual defendants. Thus the
Jacuzzi opinion, relying as it does on the outdated rationale of Otis,
should be overruled insofar as it allows dual representation of poten-
tially conflicting interests.
Conclusion
The present view in the federal courts is that counsel who repre-
sent both the corporate and insider defendants in derivative litigation
are not able to guide the litigation in the corporation's best interest
because of the potential conflict of interest inherent in the derivative
action. Clearly, an attorney who undertakes dual representation vio-
lates the mandates of the CPR and Canon 6 of the American Bar Asso-
ciation Canons of Professional Ethics because "in behalf of one client it
is his duty to contend for that which his duty to another client requires
him to oppose."' 122 Following the dictates and ethical wisdom of the
CPR, the federal courts have developed a strong policy of disallowing
dual representation in derivative actions. This position is equitable to-
ward all persons affected by the action. The rule against dual represen-
120. See Dettamanti v. Lompoc Union School Dist., 143 Cal. App. 2d 715, 723, 300 P.2d
78, 83-84 (1956) (district attorney representing both school district and child injured on
school property in personal injury action); Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 153-
54, 249 P.2d 885, 888 (1952) (attorney representing both insurance company and insured):
Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 773, 143 P.2d 940, 946 (1944) (attorney acting as
counsel for defendant in automobile guest action in good faith charged collusion between
plaintiff and defendant). See also Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 293 P. 788 (1930). The
California Supreme Court stated in Anderson: "[An attorney is precluded from assuming
any relation which would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's inter-
ests. Nor does it matter that the intention and motives of the attorney are honest." Id at
116, 293 P. at 790.
121. See notes 58-64 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of potential conflict.
122. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6.
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tation frees the attorney from the untenable position of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Canon 5 of the CPR. Forbidding
dual representation ensures that the corporation will obtain full and
fair inquiry into the merits of the case, be the recipient of its independ-
ent counsers undivided loyalty, and not have its recovery prejudiced by
procedural defenses interposed on its behalf by counsel favoring the
rights of the insider defendants. The corporation will be adequately
represented in any settlement negotiations, and protected from the
hardship of counsel withdrawing from the action if an actual conflict
arises.
The lead of the federal courts and other state jurisdictions in disal-
lowing dual representation should be followed by the California courts,
and the Jacuzzi opinion overruled insofar as it permits dual representa-
tion in derivative actions. Only when the California courts adopt a pol-
icy of forbidding dual representation in derivative actions where
directors and officers of the corporation are named as individual de-
fendants will the corporation and the shareholders be assured of full
and fair representation in the courts of the state.

